interpreting section 5, Reno v. Bossier Parish (Bossier Parish 1), 7 and Reno v. Bossier Parish (Bossier Parish I) .8 These decisions, handed down in 1997 and 2000 respectively, narrowly construe the VRA's preclearance provision and invoke federalism concerns as justification. Bossier Parish I holds that section 5 does not block implementation of voting changes that violate section 2 of the VRA, 9 noting that the contrary construction would "increase further the serious federalism costs already implicated by § 5.
" 10 Bossier Parish II reads section 5's purpose prong to proscribe retrogressive intent only, and not an intent to dilute or an invidious intent more generally, and strangely cites Lopez as support for its claim that the broader reading would "exacerbate the 'substantial' federalism costs that the preclearance procedure already exacts."' I Left unexplained is why the Court understood the federalism costs implicated in the Bossier Parish cases to be preclusively high, while it viewed the costs at issue in Lopez to be the necessary andjustifiable result of implementing the VRA. As part of this Symposium on "The New Federalism," this Article will attempt an explanation. After providing a synopsis of the decisions in Lopez and the Bossier Parish cases, it evaluates several rationales for why the Court might have assessed the federalism costs so differently in each decision. The implementation of congressional intent fails as an explanation given that Congress appears to have intended the broad construction of section 5 in all three cases.
1 2 Nor can the decisions be reconciled based on the principle that enforcement of the Fourteenth and Fifteenth Amendments warrants intrusion into state sovereign processes. Insofar as the Court read section 5 broadly in Lopez because it understood the statute to be enforcing a constitutional right, it should have likewise adopted broad readings in the Bossier Parish cases. So too, an understanding of the Constitution to mandate colorblindness lacks explanatory power given that all three decisions promote racially-informed decisionmaking. Finally, the view that the majority-minority district gives rise to a distinct, constitutionally-cognizable harm fails to explain the difference in approach because this view should have led the Court to adopt narrow constructions of section 5 in all three cases. 1 3 Instead, the Court's differing assessment of federalism costs in Lopez and the Bossier Parish cases may best be seen to reflect the Court's concern about institutional overreaching by the Department ofJustice (DOJ). The 7. 520 U.S. 471 (1997) [ hereinafter Bossier Parish 1]. 8. 528 U.S. 320 (2000) [hereinafter Bossier Parish II] . 9. Section 2 of the VRA, as amended in 1982, prohibits any voting "standard, practice, or procedure" that "results in a denial or abridgement of the right.., to vote on account of race or color." 42 U.S.C. § 1973(a) (1994) ; see also infra note 58.
10. Bossier Parish 1, 520 U.S. at 480. 11. See Bossier Parish II, 528 U.S. at 336 (quoting Lopez v. Monterey County, 525 U.S. 266, 282 (1999) ).
12. See infra Part II.A.
See infra Part II.B.
Rehnquist Court has long been convinced that DOJ has systematically abused its authority in the preclearance process and thereby exacerbated the federalism costs that inhere in the VRA. 14 The Bossier Parish cases involved DOJ's refusal to preclear a districting plan that the agency deemed to contain an insufficient number of majority-minority districts. 15 Thus, these cases presented the Court with the type of DOJ conduct that the justices have repeatedly found most objectionable. The Bossier Parish decisions rejected DOJ's position on preclearance and construed section 5 narrowly to curb opportunities for institutional overreaching by DOJ. Lopez, by contrast, did not directly implicate conduct by DOJ, and instead addressed a question over which the Department has no authority, namely whether the disputed changes were subject to preclearance at all. While the decision renders more conduct subject to preclearance and hence to review by DOJ, 16 Lopez required the Court neither to review a specific decision made by DOJ nor to confront the prospect that DOJ would implement the construction of the statute adopted. The Court, consequently, was able to construe section 5 broadly without directly facing concerns about DOJ overreaching, and thereby to embrace the resulting federalism costs as a justified consequence of implementing congressional intent in the VRA.
I. THE DECISIONS
Perhaps more so than any other federal law to be upheld by the United States Supreme Court, section 5 of the VRA, as enacted in 1965 and extended since, 16. Claims that an electoral change is subject to preclearance may be brought before a state court or federal three-judge court within the jurisdiction, while the Attorney General or the federal district court in the District of Columbia evaluate preclearance submissions on their merits. See 42 U.S. C. § 1973c (1994) ; see also Lopez v. Monterey County, 519 U.S. 9, 23-24 (1996) (noting that three-judge district court "may determine only whether § 5 covers a contested change, whether § 5's approval requirements were satisfied, and if the requirements were not satisfied, what temporary remedy, if any, is appropriate"); SAMUEL ISSACHAROFF ET AL., THE LAw OF DEMocRAcy 579-80 (2d ed., 2001 ) (describing division of authority regarding coverage questions and merits of preclearance submissions).
17. SeeVoting Rights Act Amendments of 1970 , Pub. L. No. 91-285, § § 2, 5, 84 Stat. 314, 314-15 (1970 ; Voting Rights Act Amendments of 1975 , Pub. L. No. 94-73, § § 204, 206, 405, 89 Stat. 402, 402-04 (1975 ; Voting Rights Act Amendments of 1982 , Pub. L. No. 97-205, § 2, 96 Stat. 131, 132-33 (1982 .
plies. 18 Applicable only in "covered" jurisdictions,' section 5 eliminates the presumption of validity that typically attaches to governmental decisionmaking by blocking such jurisdictions from "enact [ing] or seek [ing] to administer any voting qualification or prerequisite to voting, or standard, practice, or procedure with respect to voting," unless the jurisdiction receives federal judicial or administrative preclearance. 2 0 Covered jurisdictions must demonstrate, either to the Attorney General or to the federal district court in D.C., that a proposed change "does not have the purpose and will not have the effect of denying or abridging the right to vote on account of race or color," or, after 1975, membership in a language minority group. 
A. Lopez v. Monterey County
Between 1972 and 1983, Monterey County, a jurisdiction covered under section 5,22 adopted and implemented a series of ordinances that consolidated the County's various judicial courts and established a single countywide municipal court served by ten judges elected at-large. 23 Through various legislative acts, California, which is not covered under section 5, facilitated this consolidation process. 1973c (1994) ). Ajurisdiction was "covered" if, on the date the VRA became effective, it employed as a prerequisite to voting devices such as a literacy, understanding, subject matter or moral character test, and less than fifty percent of the voting age population was registered or actually voted in the presidential election of 1964. In 1991, a group of Latino voters residing in the County filed suit, claiming that section 5 required that the County obtain preclearance before implementing the ordinances. Complex proceedings followed. A three-judge panel of the United States District Court for the Northern District of California agreed that preclearance was required, 25 and the County initiated an action in the federal district court in D.C. to obtain it. 26 The County, however, subsequently agreed to dismiss its suit, stipulating that the ordinances had a retrogressive effect on Latino voting strength and accordingly that it could not establish that they complied with section 5.27 Thereafter, the parties returned to the federal threejudge panel in northern California with a new plan that retained a countywide municipal court, but created districts from which judges would be elected .28
California intervened in the proceedings and argued that the plan conflicted with the California Constitution, which requires correspondence between ajudge's electoral base and his or her jurisdictional base.
29
The three-judge panel agreed and refused to approve the plan. When the parties could not agree on a new plan that complied with both state and federal law, the district court imposed a temporary plan under which judges would be elected from districts, but serve countywide. The court recognized that the plan conflicted with state law, but deemed the intrusion on state interests to be relatively minor. 30 The County submitted this interim plan for preclearance and readily obtained it. judicial elections under the original, unprecleared countywide regime. The panel decreed that this plan was to govern the 1996 election only and enjoined future elections pending preclearance of a permanent plan.
3
The Supreme Court responded with an emergency stay of the district court's order and a subsequent decision enjoining the County from using the unprecleared plan.
3 4 The Court acknowledged "the predicament" faced by the three-judge panel given the County's longstanding failure to obtain preclearance of a usable districting plan, the difficulty in constructing a plan that complied with both state and federal law, and the fact that simply enjoining elections "would leave the County without ajudicial electoral system." 3 5 In the Court's view, however, these factors did not alter the fact that the County "has not discharged its obligation to submit its voting changes" for preclearance. "The requirement of federal scrutiny must be satisfied without delay."1 3 6
On remand, the district court, perhaps seeking a way out of the morass, reversed its original holding that section 5 applied to the County's ordinances. Finding persuasive California's argument that state, not county, law mandated the judicial structure the County had implemented, 3 7 the court held that a jurisdiction is subject to the preclearance requirement only when it exercises some element of discretion over the implemented electoral change. The County, the court found, had no choice but to implement the countywide system and hence no duty to obtain preclearance. More specifically, the court deemed relevant two laws consolidating the county courts. The first was a 1979 state statute that consolidated the County's three existing municipal courts and mandated a single municipal court district in the County. As an uncovered jurisdiction, California, the court noted, was not required to obtain preclearance of this statute. See id. at 276-77. The court identified the only other relevant change to the county's judicial electoral structure to be a 1983 county ordinance merging the County's remaining justice court districts into the municipal court district. California had sought and obtained the Attorney General's approval for a 1983 state law recognizing the county's 1983 court merger and authorizing new judgeships for it. The Attorney General did not oppose the submission, which included a copy of a 1983 county ordinance merging the courts, and accordingly the submission "may well have served to preclear the 1983 county ordinance." See Lopez, 519 U.S. at 15. Even if, however, the state law had not been precleared, the court held that a 1995 amendment to the California Constitution eliminating the justice courts would have resulted in the same merger effected by the 1983 cotnty ordinance, and thus preclearance of those ordinances was not required. See Lopez, 525 U.S. at 276-77; CAL. CONsr. art. VI, § 5(b).
The Supreme Court again reversed. Justice O'Connor's opinion in Lopez holds that a covered jurisdiction "seek[s] to administer" a voting change within the meaning of section 5 "when, without exercising any independent discretion ....
[it] implements a change required by the superior law of a noncovered State." 39 Justice O'Connor writes that neither the word "seek" nor the word "administer" lends itself to a definition precluding nondiscretionary acts, and that other decisions by the Court and lower federal courts assumed that voting changes enacted by partially covered States and affecting covered localities must be precleared. She notes further that the Attorney General construed section 5 to be applicable in these circumstances and that DOJ routinely received preclearance submissions from States in these circumstances.
40
Justice Thomas' sole dissent charged that requiring preclearance of a covered jurisdiction's implementation of a mandatory state law would thwart the State's implementation of a uniform statewide voting policy. Section 5, he writes, "is a unique requirement that exacts significant federalism costs" and that "[t]he Section's interference with state sovereignty is quite drastic."
42 Application of section 5 must hinge on the jurisdiction's history of wrongdoing, he argues, and this requirement is ignored by a rule that requires preclearance of a covered jurisdiction's nondiscretionary implementation of an uncovered jurisdiction's mandates. The majority's construction thus "raise to new levels the federalism costs that the statute imposes."
43
Justice O'Connor readily dismisses this concern. The VRA, she writes, "authorizes federal intrusion into sensitive areas of state and local poli- The Court understood the burdens imposed by section 5 quite differently when it assessed whether a districting plan adopted by the Bossier Parish School Board (the Board) deserved preclearance. Citing federalism concerns, Bossier Parish I and Bossier Parish II adopt narrow constructions of section 5 and thereby enable covered jurisdictions to obtain preclearance more easily.
The dispute in the Bossier Parish cases concerned the redistricting plan adopted by the Board following the 1990 Census. The Board, a covered jurisdiction under the VRA, consists of twelve members elected from single-member districts to serve four-year terms. At the time the Board set out to redraw its districts, 48 the Bossier Parish Police Jury, the principal governing body of the Parish, had already adopted and obtained preclearance of a twelve-district redistricting plan for its elections. The Board, however, initially declined to adopt the police jury plan, most likely because it transgressed some of the Board's traditional districting principles.
49
As the Board embarked on devising its own plan, the local NAACP chapter sought inclusion in the districting process and submitted a redistricting proposal that included two majority-black districts.
5 0 The population of the Parish at the time was approximately twenty percent AfricanAmerican.
5 ' The record indicates that at least some members of the Board were opposed to creating any majority-black districts 52 and that the Board generally was not receptive to the NAACP's proposal. § 1973(b) (1994) .
Proof of vote dilution under section 2 requires establishment of the so-called Gingles preconditions. SeeThornburg v. Gingles, 478 U.S. 30, 50-51 (1986) (setting forth preconditions that racial group "is sufficiently large and geographically compact to constitute a majority in a single-member district;" that the group is "politically cohesive," and that the majority "votes sufficiently as a bloc to enable it... usually to defeat the minority's preferred candidate"). Section 2 also requires evidence that the totality of circumstances supports the dilutive quality of the practice. SeeJohnson v. DeGrandy, 512 U. S. 997, 1011 (1994) .
59. See also 28 C.F.R. § 51.55(b)(2) (1996) (authorizing denial of preclearance to prevent "clear violation" of section 2).
60. The Board responded to the Attorney General's ruling by seeking and obtaining preclearance in federal district court. There, the three-judge panel, over a dissent, rejected the Attorney General's construction of section 5, holding that a section 2 violation is not grounds to deny preclearance. See Bossier Parish v. Reno, 907 F. Supp. 434, 440-41 (D.D.C. 1995) . The court further held that evidence of a section 2 violation does not inform the inquiry into discriminatory purpose under section 5. See id. at 445. Finally, the court held that the Board had acted with legitimate, nondiscriminatory purposes in adopting the police jury plan, (1996) , and not on the finding that the plan was retrogressive. See 520 U.S. at 475 (noting parties' stipulation that plan was not retrogressive); id. at 499 (Stevens, J., dissenting in part and concurring in part) (noting that "[n]one of the 12 districts had ever had a black majority and a black person had never been elected to the Board"). Following Bossier Parish I, the Board acknowledged that its adopted plan diluted the minority vote in violation of section 2. See Bossier Parish I, 528 U.S. at 343-44, 349 (Souter,J., 
10
Villanova Law Review, Vol. 46, Iss. 5 [2001] , Art. 8 https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/vlr/vol46/iss5/8 Justice Scalia's opinion for a divided Court holds that section 5's purpose prong proscribes only a retrogressive purpose, and not a discriminatory purpose more broadly understood. 6 7 He explains that the Court had already concluded that section 5's use of the phrase "abridging the right to vote on account of race or color" limited the term "effect" to retrogressive effect.
6 8 Established canons of statutory interpretation, Justice Scalia writes, require that retrogression also provide the measure of a section 5 purpose, otherwise, the Court "would attribute different meanings to the same phrase in the same sentence.
' 69 Precedent suggested the Court had previously recognized such a divergence, but Bossier Parish II deems it distinguishable.
7°1 Nor does limiting section 5's purpose prong to retrogressive purpose render it meaningless: while the natural linguistic consequence of the parallel construction meant that only the incompetent retrogresser would violate it and not also run afoul of its effects prong, 7 1 the term retains "value and effect," Bossier Parish II asserts, given that the government may more easily refute ajurisdiction's claim of nonretrogressive purpose than its assertion of nonretrogressive effect.
72
Bossier Parish II recognizes that section 5 contains language "virtually identical" to language in section 2 of the VRA and the Fifteenth Amendment and that the Court had read the latter provisions to extend beyond retrogression. Bossier Parish II, however, insists that the "context" of the preclearance process, with its goal of preventing "backsliding," explains the difference in approach.
73
" A broader construction of section 5, Justice Scalia explains, would conflate section 2 with section 5, something "we declined to do in Bossier Parish L-74 Concerns for federalism, the Court insists, also counsel against this approach, particularly given the "ex-67. Considerable evidence suggested that the Board acted with invidious, but not retrogressive, intent when it adopted the challenged districting plan. See Bossier Parish II, 528 U.S. 320, 343-355 (2000) (Souter, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (detailing Board's repeated efforts to block desegregation and other actions evincing discriminatory intent 358 (1975) , created a discontinuity between the effect and purpose prongs of § 5," given that the decision both approved a voting change despite its seeming retrogressive effect and asserted that a retrogressive purpose warranted a denial of preclearance. Bossier Parish H dismisses this disjunction as "nothing more than an ex necessitate limitation upon the effect prong in the particular context of annexation." See id. at 330; cf id. at 369-71 (Souter, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (reading Richmond to extend beyond annexation context and to hold that discriminatory, albeit nonretrogressive intent, suffices to block preclearance).
71. See id. at 332 (noting that "[w]henever Congress enacts a statute that bars conduct having 'the purpose or effect of x,' the purpose prong has application entirely separate from that of the effect prong only with regard to unlikely conduct that has 'the purpose of x' but fails to have 'the effect of x"').
72. 78 and thus the Court adopts the narrow construction.
II. THE CASES COMPARED
Lopez and the Bossier Parish cases approach section 5 very differently. Lopez readily interprets the preclearance provision broadly, easily accepting the "intrusion" into "sensitive areas of state and local policymaking" effected by the statute and its consequent "substantial 'federalism costs. '" ' 79 The Court in the Bossier Parish cases appears far more wary of the statute's intrusiveness and more inclined to limit its scope to minimize the resulting "federalism costs." Relying on conclusory statements about federal power, these decisions fail to explain the distinct value each attaches to the federalism costs at issue. This Part assesses several factors that might explain the difference in approach.
A. Congressional Intent
Congressional intent fails to explain the Court's divergent assessment of federalism costs in these cases. To be sure, insofar as Congress intended the application of section 5 adopted in Lopez, the resulting federalism costs are warranted, or at least the Court could so conclude, assuming, of course, that Congress had constitutional power to enact such a provision.3° Likewise, if the broader construction of section 5 rejected in the Bossier Parish cases contravened congressional intent, the Court rightly refused to countenance the federalism costs that would have resulted. But while Congress may have intended the construction of section 5 adopted in Lopez, it appears not to have intended the construction of section 5 approved in the Bossier Parish cases and, indeed, likely intended the rejected readings. REV. 379, 380 (2000) (arguing that Bossier Parish ll"imposed its own restrictive view of the statute over a constitutionally permissible interpretation that both Congress and the Justice Department had found to be politically accountable and just"). But see The Supreme Court, 1996 Term: Leading Cases, 111 HARv. L. REV. 421, 426 (1997 Lopez locates congressional support for its construction of section 5 primarily in the statute's language. "The face of the Act itself," Justice O'Connor writes, "provides the most compelling support" for this construction. 82 She explains that in common parlance, "seek to administer" encompasses nondiscretionary acts, and provides "no indication" Congress intended to limit preclearance to the discretionary acts of a covered jurisdiction. 83 This understanding of congressional intent, O'Connor continues, is strengthened by precedent, which has assumed section 5's application when a noncovered State effects voting changes in covered counties;
84 by the practice of DOJ, which routinely reviews preclearance applications from uncovered jurisdictions; 8 5 and by the Attorney General's understanding of congressional intent, which parallels the Court's.
86
The central purpose of the preclearance process, however, arguably suggests a contrary reading. Congress enacted section 5 "to shift the advantage of time and inertia from the perpetrators of the evil to its victim."
87 Under section 5, electoral changes implemented by jurisdictions covered because of their history of wrongdoing are presumed to be invalid, and the jurisdictions themselves face the burden of proving otherwise. This regime suggests Congress anticipated that preclearance would be applicable only to the decisions of covered jurisdictions themselves, that is, to the choices made by covered entities as opposed to their nondiscretionary implementation of mandates issued by others. 88 Both the concurrence and dissent raise this point, but their opposition to the majority's understanding of congressional intent is noticeably tepid. Justice Kennedy's concurring opinion notes that it is "quite possible" that the statute requires a discretionary element and states that this reading "draws some support" from precedent.
89 Similarly measured, Justice Thomas' dissent acknowledges that "the majority's construction of the phrase [seek to administer] is not plainly erroneous." 9°' He offers an alternative reading of the phrase to preclude nondiscretionary acts, 9 ' but does so, as does Justice Kennedy, not so much because he deems Congress to have dictated this (arguing that Bossier Parish I "reached the result most consistent with legislative intent and precedent").
82. Lopez, 525 U.S. at 278.
See id.
84. See id. at 279-80.
85. See id. at 280. 86. See id. at 281 (noting that "we find it especially relevant that the Attorney General also reads § 5 as we do" and that "we traditionally afford substantial deference" to Attorney General's interpretation) (citations omitted). This deference is markedly absent in both Bossier Parish cases. See infra notes 94, 118 and accompanying text.
87. H.R. REP. No. 94-196, at 57-58 (1970 result, but because of his concern that the majority's construction is "constitutionally doubtful." 9 2 Indeed, it is this constitutional doubt, and not the clarity of congressional intent, that leads both justices to ignore the Attorney General's view of the matter.'
5 To the extent Congress did not unambiguously mandate Lopez's rule, that view, which parallels the Court's holding, represents a reasonable construction of the statute. Neither the dissent nor the concurrence suggests otherwise.
By contrast, the Bossier Parish decisions sustain narrow and strained readings of section 5 that are difficult to square with Congress' likely intent. Bossier Parish I holds that Congress never intended that a prohibited section 5 effect encompass a violation of section 2, and finds this intent to be "sufficiently clear" to warrant invalidation of the Attorney General's contrary regulation. 94 Justice O'Connor's opinion locates this intent not in the language of the statute,9' 5 but in precedent and the congressional 92. Id. at 293 (Thomas, J., dissenting) (noting that "'[w]here a statute is susceptible of two constructions, by one of which grave and doubtful constitutional questions arise and by the other of which such questions are avoided, our duty is to adopt the latter"') (quoting United States v. Del. & Hudson Co., 213 U.S. 366, 408 (1909) 245-46 (1996) (urging judicial restraint against curbing agency discretion based on "mere fact that an agency is acting in an area with constitutional implications," and arguing that "the agency's interpretation must raise a concrete and avoidable constitutional question, in order to trump Chevron deference").
94. See Bossier Parish 1, 520 U.S. 471, 483 (1997) (refusing to defer to Attorney General's regulation that preclearance be withheld "to prevent a clear violation of amended Section 2") (quoting 28 C.F.R. § 51.55(b) (2) (1996)).
95. See id. at 497, 503 (Stevens, J., dissenting in part and concurring in part) (noting that majority does not hold Attorney General's regulation to conflict with statutory text).
failure to alter that precedent by amending the language of section 5. 96 That precedent, however, is hardly unequivocal and indeed, like the legislative history to the VRA's 1982 amendments, supports the interpretation adopted by the Attorney General's regulation, namely that changes violating section 2 should not be precleared.
97
The longstanding precedent to which Justice O'Connor referred was the Court's 1976 decision, Beer v. United States, 98 in which the Court, for the first time, 99 stated that section 5 was meant to block voting changes that "would lead to a retrogression in the position of racial minorities."1 0 0
Beer added, however, that "an ameliorative new legislative apportionment cannot violate § 5 unless the new apportionment itself so discriminates on the basis of race or color as to violate the Constitution."Il" Thus, Beeritself indicated that the Court did not understand retrogression to be the sole measure of section 5.102 The question is how far beyond retrogression the Court understood section 5 to extend. Beer referenced White v. Regester' 0 3 for its assertion that unconstitutional voting practices should not be precleared. White held unconstitutional an apportionment plan under which, based on the totality of circumstances, members of a racial minority "had less opportunity than did other residents in the district to participate 96. See id. at 483 (noting that "[g]iven our longstanding interpretation of § 5, which Congress has declined to alter by amending the language of § 5, we believe Congress has made it sufficiently clear that a violation of § 2 is not grounds in and of itself for denying preclearance under § 5") (citations omitted). Court, 1996 Term, supra note 81, at 422 (arguing that Bossier Parish I "reached the result truest to congressional intent and judicial precedent").
But cf The Supreme
98. 425 U. S. 130 (1976) . Bossier Parish I also relies on City of Lockhart v. United States, which holds that preclearance is warranted where proposed changes "may have the effect of discriminating against minorities" in some circumstances, because the changes did "not increase the degree of discrimination" against a minority population . See Lockhart, 460 U.S. 125, 134, 135 (1983) . Lockhart, however, relied exclusively on Beerfor its conclusion that the absence of retrogression means preclearance is warranted and, like Beer itself, did not involve the allegation that a nonretrogressive change "was so discriminatory that it clearly violated some other federal law." See id. at 134-36; see also Bossier Parish I, 520 U.S. at 503 (Stevens, J., dissenting in part and concurring in part).
99. See Bossier Parish II, 528 U.S. 320, 364 n.13 (2000) (Souter, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (noting that term retrogression "appears for the first time in a federal case in Bee'); Lockhart, 460 U.S. at 134 (reading Beer as holding that preclearance should follow where "new plan does not increase the degree of discrimination against blacks"); United Jewish Org. v. Carey, 430 U.S. 144, 159 (1977) and Congress responded by codifying the White v. Regester standard in the 1982 amendments to section 2 of the VRA.)°7 With the constitutional standard now diverging from the statutory one, the question arises whether changes that violate the latter are grounds to deny preclearance. Beer itself does not answer that question as the Court there had no occasion to confront it and the decision is inherently ambiguous on this point.
The legislative history to the 1982 amendments to the VRA suggests, however, that Congress meant for a violation of amended section 2 to be grounds to deny preclearance. The Senate Report squarely states that "in light of the amendment to section 2, it is intended that a section 5 objection also follow if a new voting procedure so discriminates as to violate section 2."108 Justice O'Connor's opinion in Bossier Parish I dismisses this seemingly unambiguous statement because Congress did not amend the language of section 5.1)9 Congress would not, she writes, "depart from the settled interpretation of § 5 and impose a demonstrably greater burden . . . by dropping a footnote in a Senate Report instead of amending the statute itself."' II' That interpretation of section 5, namely that retrogression defines the full scope of a section 5 effect, however, was hardly settled, and the "demonstrably greater burden" was that imposed by governing law before the Court's 1980 S. 837 (1984) , is accorded to agency interpretations found in formal agency regulations or produced by other procedures assuring "fairness and deliberation"); see also id. at 2184 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (arguing Chevron deference applies so long as agency position is evident "in a course of unstructured administrative actions" and reflects "the official position of the agency"). The Court, moreover, in Lopez and other The Attorney General's construction of section 5 and the longstanding practice of DOJ implementing it proved no more persuasive to the Court in Bossier Parish II. In this case, the Court again adopts a construction of the statute that seems contrary to congressional intent, holding that section 5's purpose prong reaches retrogressive intent only and not discriminatory intent more broadly. Bossier Parish II states that established principles of statutory construction and the particular "context" of preclearance demonstrate that Congress intended this result. Neither factor, however, unequivocally establishes congressional intent on this point.
First, Justice Scalia states that section 5's purpose prong must be limited to retrogressive purpose because Beer held retrogression to define the full scope of a section 5 effect. This reading of Beer 19 supports the Court's construction, but does not mandate it; 1 21 that is, even if Congress meant to limit section 5's prohibition on discriminatory effects to retrogressive effects, 1 2 1 it need not have intended to restrict similarly the statute's prohibition on discriminatory purpose. A discriminatory purpose such as an intent to dilute is always invidious, while a policy yielding a dilutive or otherwise discriminatory effect may or may not reflect ill-will on the part of the policymaker. that section 5 blocks changes that violate Constitution was referring neither to intentional discrimination, which had yet to become essential element of constitutional violation, nor to effects-based discrimination, which would have negated retrogression standard, and instead was to unconstitutional action that denies, as opposed to abridges, right to vote, and thus does not encompass vote dilution, which falls under latter term). does not preserve the status quo, but actively promotes equal opportunity in the political process. Indeed, Congress' decision to use the same language in section 5 as appears in the Fifteenth Amendment suggests its intent for the statute to transcend retrogressive practices. Congressional reliance on terminology that tracks the language of the constitutional provision it seeks to enforce is generally read to signal congressional intent that the terms be given the same meaning. [from] a single fragment of legislative history," and arguing that "the legislative history is replete with references to the need to block changes in voting practices that would perpetuate existing discrimination and stand in the way of truly nondiscriminatory alternatives").
See Bossier Parish
133. See, e.g., S. REP. No. 97-417, at 6 (preclearance procedure "was designed to insure that old devices for disenfranchisement would not simply be replaced by new ones"); S. REP. No. 94-295, at 15-17 (1975) 135 has been thought to proscribe racial vote dilution. 136 To be sure, the term "dilution" was not used before 1969, but the practice predates the term,' 37 and even if it did not, the very purpose of the preclearance process is to block "new ways and means of discriminating" implemented as old "contrivances" are struck down.
13 8 Each time Congress extended section 5 to provide for additional years of coverage, it noted its expectation that the preclearance standard would encompass racial vote dilution.
9
At bottom, Bossier Parish II espouses an implausible conclusion: namely, even though Congress created the preclearance procedure because covered jurisdictions engaged repeatedly in acts of unconstitutional discrimination, it did not intend to block implementation of voting changes enacted with precisely this purpose.
1 4 0 The Attorney General had long adopted the contrary interpretation, denying preclearance to changes DOJ determined had been enacted or implemented with a discriminatory purpose. 1865-1890, 126, 269-73 (1978) .
138. H.R. REP. No. 89-439, at 10. 139. See S. REP. No. 97-417, at 6 (noting that following rise in registration resulting from VRA of 1965, "a broad array of dilution schemes were employed to cancel the impact of the new black vote"); S. REP. No. 94-295, at 16-17 (identifying continuing need for preclearance procedure given adoption of dilutive measures including switching to at-large elections, annexations of predominately white areas or adoption of discriminatory redistricting plans); H.R. REP. No. 91-397, at 6-7 (noting continued need for preclearance requirement given that, as voter registration rose, various jurisdictions "have undertaken new, unlawful ways to diminish the Negroes' franchise and to defeat Negro and Negro-supported candidates" including use of numerous dilutive techniques); see also S. REP. No. 97-417, at 7 n.8 (noting that in both 1970 and 1975, Congress renewed section 5 "with ftll awareness of its interpretation by the courts to include dilution and other evasive mechanisms, as well as outright denials of the opportunity to register or vote" and that "Congress has twice ratified this interpretation of the intended scope of Section 5").
140. See also Rubin, supra note 122, at 92 (describing Bossier Parish I's "remarkable holding that preclearance under the Voting Rights Act must be granted to laws that are adopted with discriminatory intent, so long as the intent behind them was to leave the members of the racial minority group against whom they are aimed in no worse a position than they were under the previous law"). 141. The applicable regulation stated that "the Attorney General will consider whether the change is free of discriminatory purpose and retrogressive effect in light of, and with particular attention being given to, the requirements of the 14th, 15th, and 24th amendments to the Constitution." See 28 C.F.R. § 51.55(a) (1994). DOJ argued that it had consistently applied this regulation to block practices im-to DOJ given its role in administering section 5,142 the decision, as Justice Souter's dissent notes, creates a regime under which "executive and judicial officers of the United States will be forced to preclear illegal and unconstitutional voting schemes patently intended to perpetuate discrimination." 4 3 The majority's claim that Congress meant to limit section 5's purpose prong to retrogressive purpose alone is unpersuasive.
B. Vindicating a Constitutional Right
The Rehnquist Court has intervened deeply in state electoral processes when it has understood the Constitution to require it. (2000), is similarly illustrative. Rice struck down as a violation of the Fifteenth Amendment a state law that provided that only "Hawaiians" could vote for trustees of the state's Office of Hawaiian Affairs ("OHA"), a public agency that oversees programs designed to benefit the State's native people. The Court held that the restriction limiting the OHA electorate to descendants of the 1778 inhabitants of the Hawaiian Islands embodied a racial classification that denied non-Hawaiians the right to vote within the meaning of the Fifteenth Amendment. While hardly self-evident, Rice's conclusion-that the OHA regime involved both a racial classification and the constitutionally protected right to vote-led the Court inexorably to its holding invalidating the voting restriction. See Katz, supra note 136, at 493-94. Along the way, Rice barely notices the federalism costs that result from its displacement of a regime constructed by the people of Hawaii via constitutional amendment to address and remedy historic discrimination unique to the Hawaiian Islands. Indeed, it is noteworthy how easily the Court displaced this local regime, which, unlike the districts at issue in cases like Shaw and its progeny, did not bear the direct imprimatur of federal law or DOJ involvement. See infra notes 195-97 and accompanying text. Thus, absent from Rice was the concern for separation of powers that informs much of the Rehnquist Court's federalism jurisprudence. See, e.g 287, 310 (1996) ; KOUSSER, supra note 137, at 422; Lowenstein, supra note 18, at 819; Rubin, supra note 122, at 112; see also Lowenstein, supra note 18, at 811 (suggesting that Shaw cases damage federalism values because political parties can no longer shape districting decisions to same degree as they once did or fully derive benefits that participation previously yielded).
The Court's willingness to override state sovereignty to vindicate a constitutional right cannot, however, explain its divergent assessment of the federalism costs in Lopez and the Bossier Parish cases. Neither section 5's status as congressional enforcement legislation nor an understanding of the Constitution to proscribe either race-conscious decisionmaking or majority-minority districts more narrowly explains the Court's approach to federalism in the respective decisions.
Congressional Enforcement Legislation
Lopez suggests that its broad construction of section 5 vindicates rights protected by the Fifteenth Amendment. The decision affirms that section 5's targeting of discriminatory effects through the burden shifting procedures of the preclearance process is a legitimate means for Congress to enforce the Fifteenth Amendment, 15 ' with the statutory proscription being understood to "'deter[ ] or remed[y] a constitutional violation,"' even though the prohibited conduct does not itself violate the Constitution.
152
As valid congressional enforcement legislation, section 5 limits state sovereignty, but these federalism costs are deemed justified.
Lopez's embrace of section 5 as valid enforcement legislation is puzzling given the increasingly stringent parameters the Court has identified as limiting congressional discretion in this realm. 
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58
The Court in Lopez is nevertheless confident that section 5, as broadly construed in the case, constitutes valid enforcement legislation vindicating rights protected by the Constitution. To the extent, however, that this understanding of section 5 explains Lopez's dismissal of the resulting federalism costs, it should have dictated contrary holdings in the Bossier Parish cases, both of which likewise construe section 5. The Court in Bossier Parish I remains nevertheless unmoved not only by section 5's status as valid enforcement legislation, but also by section 2's, 159 and instead invokes federalism as a reason to order preclearance of a change that violates section 2.160 Even more puzzling in this regard, Bossier Parish II rejects a construction of section 5 that would have blocked implementation of a patently unconstitutional change, all the while asserting that the rejected construction was constitutionally suspect. 
Colorblindness and the Majority-Minority District
The Rehnquist Court, at times, has suggested the Reconstruction Amendments promote colorblind decisionmaking, 162 J. 2537, 2544 (1998) .
Bossier Parish I, however, predates City of Boerne, makes no reference to the question of section 2's constitutional validity, and contains nothing to suggest that concern about the adequacy of congressional authority to enact section 2 informed the Court's construction of section 5.
160. See Bossier Parish I, 520 U.S. 471, 480 (1997 Both Lopez and Bossier Parish I promote race-conscious decisionmaking of the sort that necessarily results from compliance with the VRA and any law barring racially discriminatory effects. Such prohibitions require those governed by them to consider race expressly or risk violating the proscription.'6" The coverage designation established in Lopez means that the County must prove that its new electoral regime does not have an impermissible purpose or effect. The only way to demonstrate the latter is for the County to assess expressly how the switch from a district-based system to an at-large one affects the interests of racial minorities. A covered jurisdiction cannot prove this effect is absent without taking race into account. 1 67 Bossier Parish I similarly discourages colorblindness. To be sure, the decision postpones, and at times will eliminate,' 6 8 the racially-informed evaluation of an electoral rule under section 2's results test. But by relying on retrogression as the measure of a section 5 effect, the decision also accepts and indeed requires functionally analogous race-conscious decisionmaking by covered jurisdictions.
The explanatory failure of colorblindness is most evident, however, in Bossier Parish II, where the Court expressly rejected a construction of section 5 that would have blocked racially informed decisionmaking in favor of one that permits it. Unlike section 5's effect prong, its purpose prong 165. See, e.g., Caminker, supra note 92, at 1194 (stating that "[t] he Reconstruction Amendments in general, and the Fourteenth Amendment in particular, worked a significant shift in the federal-state balance of power, as part of which the states waived various features of their erstwhile sovereign status"); Victor W. Rotnem, Enforcement of Civil Rights, 3 NAT'L B.J. 1, 4 (1945) (noting that Reconstruction Era amendments "drastically altered the earlier balance of power between the states and the Federal government").
166. See, e.g., Lowenstein, supra note 18, at 825 (noting that under both section 2 and section 5 of VRA "race is a privileged criterion" and that "[t]he legislature and everyone who participates in the process must begin with race"); Lisa The Rehnquist Court generally has been unpersuaded by the contention that seemingly benignly-motivated, racially-informed decisionmaking is different in kind from that motivated by racial animus. See, e.g., Miller, 515 U.S. 900, 920-21 (1995); Adarand, 515 U.S. 200, 227 (1995); Croson, 488 U.S. 469, 493-94 (1989) ; Wygant v. Jackson Bd. of Educ., 476 U. S. 267, 273-74 (1986) .
167. See, e.g., Rubin, supra note 122, at 107 (describing Court's "implicit recognition that race-based districting to avoid retrogression may well be required to satisfy the effect prong of section 5 preclearance scrutiny").
168. See infra note 189.
does not inherently require that jurisdictions engage in race-conscious decisionmaking. Justice Scalia nevertheless reads section 5 to permit coveredjurisdictions not only to consider race, but also to discriminate invidiously based on race, so long as they do not hold a retrogressive intent.
16 9
A commitment to colorblindness accordingly cannot explain the Court's assessment of federalism costs in Lopez and the Bossier Parish cases. Similarly, the sentiment that the Constitution bars the majority-minority district, as a distinct subset of racially informed decisionmaking, also fails as an explanation. The Rehnquist Court repeatedly has held that, at the behest of DOJ, 170 or by the apparent command of the Court's own prece- ates into racial blocs."); id. at 911-12 ("When the State assigns voters on the basis of race, it engages in the offensive and demeaning assumption that voters of a particular race, because of their race, 'think alike, share the same political interests, and will prefer the same candidates at the polls."' (quoting Shaw I, 509 U.S. at 647)); Johnson, 512 U.S. at 1020 (recognizing that majority-minority districts may "sometimes" be necessary "to ensure equal political and electoral opportunity," but emphasizing that such districts embody "'the politics of second best,' and should be avoided whenever diverse ethnic and racial coalitions are possible"); Holder v. Hall, 512 U.S. 874, 892, 903, 905, 907 (1994) (Thomas, J., concurring) (arguing that majority-minority districts represent "racial 'balkanization' of the Nation," that they "segregat[e] the races into political homelands that amount[ ], in truth, to nothing short of a system of 'political apartheid;' that they give "credence to the view that race defines political interest," and that "few devices could be better designed to exacerbate racial tensions that the consciously segregated districting system currently being constructed in the name of the Voting Rights Act" (quoting the Fourteenth and Fifteenth Amendments. 1 74 While the contours of any such constitutional injury have not been developed, the justices' evident preference for the influence district over the majority-minority district suggests they understand the latter to produce a harm distinct from that they associate with the race-consciousness that informs the creation of both types of districts.
175 That this harm may be of constitutional dimension finds circumstantial support in the fact that the only two Court decisions to uphold after argument a racially informed district against a Shaw challenge both involved districts that were not majority-minority.
176
But even if the Court were convinced that the majority-minority district gives rise to a distinct harm cognizable under the Reconstruction Amendments and thus that the need to curb the creation of such districts warrants encroachments into state sovereignty, such a conviction cannot explain its divergent assessment of federalism costs in Lopez and the Bossier Parish cases. To be sure, had the Court construed section 5 to block the Bossier Parish School Board from implementing its districting plan, either because the plan violated section 2 or because the Board acted with a discriminatory, albeit not retrogressive, purpose, the decision would have caused the Board to adopt either the NAACP's plan or some other plan containing one, and likely two, majority-minority districts.
177 And yet, the Court's construction of the statute in Lopez, while not directly requiring the County to create majority-minority districts, opened the door to such a mandate. Holding section 5 applicable to the county ordinances meant that the County needed to submit the changes for preclearance before it could implement them. Given that those ordinances replaced a district-174. See, e.g., Lowenstein, supra note 18, at 801 (stating that "majority of the majority [in the Shaw cases] regards the intentional creation of [a majority-minority district] as presumptively unconstitutional" but that majority of Court does not).
175. See, e.g., Johnson, 512 U.S. at 1020 (expressing this preference) ; see also Bossier Parish 1, 520 U.S. 471, 491 (1997) (Thomas, J., concurring) (arguing that increasing number of majority-minority districts "necessarily decreases the level of minority influence in surrounding districts, and to that extent 'dilutes' the vote of minority voters in those other districts, and perhaps dilutes the influence of the minority group as a whole"); Holder, 512 U.S. at 900-01 (Thomas, J., concurring) (discussing influence districts); Voinovich v. Quilter, 507 U. S. 146, 154-155 (1993) (noting potential differences between majority-minority and influence districts).
The harm, accordingly, stems not from race-consciousness itself, but from the perception that too much reliance on race in districting decisions thwarts the meaningful exercise of the vote. Cf Katz, supra note 136, at 525-26 (suggesting that justices joining majority opinion in Rice v. Cayetano, 528 U.S. 495 (2000) , disagree with those concurring about when reliance on race in districting becomes excessive).
176. See Hunt v. Cromartie, 121 S. Ct. 1452 , 1457 (2001 (noting district's "heavily African-American (47%) voting population"); Lawyer v. Dept. of Justice, 521 U.S. 567, 571-73 (1997) (noting that district's population declined from 45% African-American in first plan to 36.2% in revised plan). But cf. DeWitt v. Wilson, 515 U.S. 1170 (1995) (summarily affirming constitutionality of majority-minority district challenged under Shaw).
177. See Bossier Parish 11, 528 U. S. 320, 323 (2000) .
VILANOVA LAW REVIEW based electoral regime with an at-large system, a denial of preclearance could easily have led to a district-based system containing at least some majority-minority districts.
178
Notwithstanding this possibility, Lopez adopts the broad construction of section 5 and accepts the federalism costs that result.
C. Institutional Overreaching at the Preclearance Hurdle
Lopez and the Bossier Parish cases construe different components of the preclearance statute. Lopez concerns a question of coverage, namely whether preclearance was required at all, while the Bossier Parish cases address the substantive standard for obtaining preclearance. The VRA vests a federal three-judge panel with jurisdiction to assess coverage questions, while it provides DOJ, along with the federal district for the District of Columbia, with authority to review the substance of preclearance submissions.
79
This division of authority may best explain the Court's differing assessment of federalism costs in the respective decisions. The Rehnquist Court has long been convinced that DOJ has abused its authority in administering the preclearance process and has intruded unjustifiably in state sovereign processes. 180 The Bossier Parish cases rely on retrogression with the unstated hope that the concept will curb the opportunities for what the Court sees as institutional overreaching by DOJ and the unjustified federalism costs it produces. Lopez, by contrast, did not directly implicate conduct by DOJ, addressing instead the coverage question. DOJ has no say on this question, and thus while the consequence of the decision is to render more conduct subject to preclearance and thus to DOJ review, 8 " the Court in Lopez had no opportunity to confront directly DOJ conduct and thus readily accepted the federalism costs that followed from its broad construction of section 5.
At issue in Lopez was whether the County was "seek[ing] to administer" a voting change within the meaning of the Act.' 82 The Rehnquist Court, with one major exception,1 8 3 has construed section 5 broadly when 178. See Lopez v. Monterey County, 525 U.S. 266, 272-74 (1999 183. The major exception is Presley v. Etowah County Commission, which held section 5 inapplicable to laws altering the powers exercised by elected county commissioners, where the laws had been adopted after voting rights litigation resulted in structural changes to the respective commissions and the election of AfricanAmerican commissioners. 502 U.S. 491, 496, 498 (1992) ; see id. at 522 n.23 (Stevens, J., dissenting); see also LANI GUINIER, THE TYRANNY OF THE MAJORITY 179-80 (1994) ; Rubin, supra note 122, at 64 n.181. Presley holds that applying section 5 to such changes would work "an unconstrained expansion of its coverage," given that "innumerable" local enactments affect the power of elected officials. See Presley, 502 U.S. at 504. Distinguishing precedent, see id. at 506-07 (stating that Allen v.
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Villanova Law Review, Vol. 46, Iss. 5 [2001] S. 646, 652 (1991) , and, prospectively, that elections may not be held tinder an unprecleared system, even when the result may be to leave the jurisdiction without an electoral system. See Lopez v. Monterey County, 519 U.S. 9, 22-23 (1996) . The Court has unanimously held that a State's failure to obtain preclearance is not cured by the preclearance of later or related changes, see Clark, 500 U.S. at 655, or changes not enumerated in the submission. See Foreman v. Dallas County, 521 U.S. 979, 980 (1997) (per curiam). But see Monroe, 522 U.S. 34; supra note 183. The Rehnquist Court was unanimous in requiring preclearance for discretionary decisions made pursuant to a precleared statute, see id. at 980; as well as for a State's implementation of separate registration systems for federal and state elections after the enactment of the National Voter Registration Act. See Young v. Fordice, 520 U.S. 273, 290 (1997) .
Over dissenting votes, moreover, the Court has held the section 5 preclearance requirement applicable to a decision to annex uninhabited land, see City of Pleasant Grove v. United States, 479 U.S. 462, 471 (1987) ; cf Bossier Parish I1, 528 U.S. 320, 33940 (2000) (reading Pleasant Grove to understand discriminatory purpose under section 5 to be retrogressive purpose), to a party-initiated filing fee for participation in the state party's nominating convention, see Morse v. Republican Party of Va., 517 U.S. 186, 201 (1995) , and to voting-related measures mandated by a noncovered State, even when the jurisdiction exercises no discretion in giving effect to the change. See Lopez, 525 U.S. at 280.
185. See, e.g., Lopez, 519 U.S. at 24 (acknowledging that its construction of section 5 might well leave jurisdiction without electoral system, but stating simply that "[t] he County has not discharged its obligation" tinder statute, and that "the requirement of federal scrutiny should be satisfied without further delay"); Clark, 500 U.S. at 660 (instructing district court to fashion remedy that "implemented the mandate of § 5 in the most equitable and practicable way with least offense to its provisions," and expressing no explicit concern for any resulting disruption in state processes); Pleasant Grove, 479 U.S. at 468 (responding to dissent's charge that has construed se&ion 5 narrowly when assessing the substantive standard the statute requires covered jurisdictions to meet before implementing an electoral change. These decisions significantly lower the hurdle to obtaining preclearance, 997, 1014 (1994) , rejected a section 2 challenge because the plan in dispute achieved rough proportionality-that is, it afforded minority voters the opportunity to exercise electoral control in a number of districts roughly proportional to their share of the population-and Bossier Parish I suggests that evidence of a section 2 violation is relevant to discriminatory purpose under section 5, see Bossier Parish 1, 520 U.S. 471, 486-91 (1997) , Miller, laying the groundwork for Bossier Parish 11, accordingly suggests that a failure to achieve rough proportionality does not inform the inquiry into section 5's prohibited purpose. S. 130, 149 (1981) . Hence the plaintiffs in Abrams charged that the district court's plan was retrogressive within the meaning of section 5. See Abrams, 521 U.S. at 95. The Court, however, found no violation of section 5 where a redistricting plan, like its predecessor, contained a single black-majority district. See id. at 97-98; see also id. at 96-97 (noting dispute about whether appropriate benchmark was last precleared plan that included single black-majority district or subsequent, unprecleared plan containing two such districts). The Court deemed this result nonretrogressive even though the increased size of the State's congressional delegation after the 1990 census meant that the black-majority district went from representing one-tenth of the State's delegation in the original plan to one-eleventh of the delegation under the new plan. See id. at 97; see also Pamela S. Karlan 358-60 (1966) (Black, J., concurring and dissenting) (arguing that section 5 "distorts our constitutional structure of government"); see also supra note 18.
189. In terms of intrusiveness, Lopez appears at least commensurate to the Bossier Parish cases, where the respective holdings offer covered jurisdictions a reprieve, but not necessarily an escape from liability under section 2 and the Constitution itself. See also Abrams, 521 U.S. at 96-98 (upholding narrow construction of section 5 that left State potentially subject to liability under section 2). To be sure, the burden of proof in these latter actions and the time and cost of litigation allow covered jurisdictions to implement and potentially retain measures that a broader construction of section 5's preclearance hurdle would immediately block. See, e.g 647, 660 (2000) (arguing that after Bossier Parish cases, preclearance no longer establishes nondiscriminatory character of districting plan and thus that precleared plans are now "more vulnerable to challenge under section 2"). That flexibility is significant, but it remains flexible to violate federal law, be it section 2 of the VRA or the Fourteenth and Fifteenth Amendments. The Court's insistence on preserving state autonomy to do so is puzzling given its acceptance of the encroachments upheld by the coverage designation in Lopez.
190. Lopez v. Monterey County, 525 U.S. 266, 294 (1999) (Thomas, J., dissenting).
policymaking."191 And while Lopez holds this intrusion to be warranted, the Court in Presley v. Etowah County Commission' 9 2 deemed coverage to be too invasive if applied to resolutions that altered the powers exercised by elected county officials. 19 3 "If federalism is to operate as a practical system of governance and not a mere poetic ideal," Justice Kennedy wrote for the Court, "States must be allowed both predictability and efficiency in structuring their governments. "' 94 But while the Court deems the federalism costs of coverage to be significant, it thinks that those costs are more likely to be justified than those incurred at the preclearance hurdle. The reason is the Rehnquist Court's dissatisfaction with the conduct of DOJ in assessing preclearance submissions.1 9 5 In the Court's view, DOJ has spent more than a decade implementing a "black maximization" policy, under which it has required covered jurisdictions to draw the maximum number of black-majority districts possible, regardless of their contours or the communities of interest they encompass. In pursuit of this "policy," DOJ is said to have denied preclearance based on unreasonable constructions of section 5,196 im-191. Id. at 282 (quoting Miller v. Johnson, 515 U.S. 900, 926 (1995) ). 192. 502 U.S. 491 (1992). 193. Etowah County's "Common Fund Resolution" ended the County's prior practice of allowing each county commissioner full authority over funds allocated to the commissioner's road district. A second resolution, passed the same day, allowed the holdover members of the newly restructured Commission to retain control over district road shops and control jointly all repair and construction work. The two new commissioners were given separate responsibilities. See Presley, 502 U.S. at 496-97. Russell County's "Unit System" abolished individual road districts and transferred authority over them to an appointed official, giving the elected officials different responsibilities. See id. at 499. 194. Id. at 510. 195 . Criticism of this sort is not a new phenomenon. See, e.g., Blanding v. Dubose, 454 U.S. 393, 401-03 (1982) (Rehnquist, J., concurring) (noting "the unreasonably burdensome and unrealistic control which the Federal Government routinely exercises over state and local governments under the Voting Rights Act;" that "the record "portrays a particularly frustrating effort to please a distant authority with veto power over the decisions of local officials;" that localities are "at the mercy of attorneys in the Justice Department;" and that " [t] here seems to be something inherently unsatisfactory about a system which places such discretionary authority in the hands of a few unelected federal officials who are wholly detached from the realities of the locality and the preferences of the local electorate.").
196. See, e.g., Shaw II, 517 U.S. 899, 913 (1996) (stating that "[i] t appears that the Justice Department was pursuing in North Carolina the same policy of maximizing the number of majority-black districts that it pursued in Georgia"); id. (noting that Court "again reject[s] the Department's expansive interpretation of § 5"); Miller v. Johnson, 515 U.S. 900, 921 (1995) (noting that "compliance with federal antidiscrimination law cannot justify race-based districting where the challenged district was not reasonably necessary under a constitutional reading and application of those laws"); id. at 924 (noting that "[i] nstead of grounding its objections on evidence of a discriminatory purpose, it would appear the Government was driven by its policy of maximizing majority-black districts"); id. at 925 (stating that "[i]n utilizing § 5 to require States to create majority-minority districts wherever possible, the Department of justice expanded its authority beyond what Congress intended and we have upheld").
properly skewed state districting processes, and forced localities to adopt unconstitutional majority-minority districts.
7
The Bossier Parish cases are informed by these views. To be sure, the opinions do not contain the biting criticism of DOJ that is prevalent in other decisions; no allegation was raised suggesting that the Board could not constitutionally draw the majority-minority districts sought by the NAACP, 198 and the Board itself subsequently acknowledged that the plan it adopted diluted the voting strength of the Parish's black population.' 99 Even so, the Bossier Parish decisions reflect the skepticism with which the Court views DOJ conduct in this realm. Both decisions emphasize the fact that the Attorney General refused to preclear the Board's plan, even though she had already precleared the identical police jury plan, and that this refusal was based on "new information" indicating that majority-minority districts could be drawn.
2°° Both decisions pointedly refuse to defer to the Attorney General's construction of the statute, despite the duct these measurements. While not unbounded, 20 6 claims of racial vote dilution are notoriously complex for both plaintiffs and defendants litigating them and for the courts adjudicating them. 2 0 7 The Bossier Parish cases suggest the Court's conviction that DOJ lacks the competence to judge when the totality of circumstances establish racial vote dilution. More precisely, the Court fears that if section 5 transcends retrogression to encompass vote dilution and other forms of nonretrogressive discrimination, DOJ will use this "new reason" to deny preclearance to "maximize" the creation of black-majority districts, and thereby to impose unwarranted federalism costs on covered jurisdictions.
8
This fear was not allayed by the fact that the federal district court in the District of Columbia, an entity whose competence the Court has not questioned in this context, is also authorized to review preclearance submissions.
20 9 DOJ processes the vast majority of preclearance requests submitted, 2 10 and covered jurisdictions often lack the time and resources to seek review in the district court. 2 11 The Bossier Parish decisions seek to restrict the discretion exercised by DOJ in this process, but the holdings necessarily limit the discretion exercised by the federal district court as well. The VRA requires that DOJ and the district court administer the same standard, such that the Court could not curb the discretion of one without restricting that of the other as well.
concerns about DOJ abuse, and thereby to embrace the resulting federalism costs as a justified consequence of implementing congressional intent in the VRA.
III. CONCLUSION
Read separately, Lopez and the Bossier Parish cases set forth starkly different portraits of the VRA's preclearance process. Lopez broadly affirms federal power to intrude deeply into sovereign state processes to vindicate the voting rights of racial minorities. Congress is given wide latitude to do so and deference is accorded both to its understanding of how best to vindicate those rights and to the Attorney General, to whom Congress delegated enforcement authority. The Bossier Parish cases present a distinct understanding of the preclearance process. The statute's intrusion into state sovereignty is viewed with skepticism and broad constructions of the statute are deemed to be of suspect constitutionality. The decisions suggest latent hostility to the creation of majority-minority districts and the conception of minority rights they embody, and more overt distrust of DOJ conduct in reviewing preclearance submissions.
Read together, the three decisions set forth a more complex portrait of the Court's understanding of the preclearance process. While seemingly irreconcilable, the decisions may be read to establish the Court's underlying commitment to preclearance as a legitimate federal structure enforcing the Fourteenth and Fifteenth Amendments, regardless of the constraints the Court has recognized on Congress' ability to enforce those amendments in other contexts. 223 The legitimacy of the federal structure, however, does not diminish the Court's concern that those exercising power within that structure have abused their authority and consequently intruded unjustifiably into state sovereignty. The Court accordingly has sought to curb federal power at the points where it has identified institutional overreaching.
To the extent that' DOJ or any federal agency acts in excess of its delegated authority, the Court indeed should restrain the abuse. The Bossier Parish cases, however, do far more. By imposing narrow and strained constructions on the statute, the decisions do not simply rein in agency excesses but prohibit the agency from exercising the discretion Congress delegated to it. Just as courts tend to accord too little deference to agency judgments touching on constitutional questions, 224 the Court's desire here to curb not only DOJ overreaching, but also opportunities for future abuse undermines the federal regime and contravenes congressional design. Accordingly, the Court's effort to curb Executive Branch overreaching has produced a different type of institutional overreaching, this time by the Court itself.
223. See supra note 6. 224. See, e.g., Wald, supra note 93, at 24546.
